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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CALL and CLARK JENKINS, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs -
Appellants, Case No. 15908 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH, 
Defendant -
Respondent. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF REHEARING 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
NICK J. COLESSIDES 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
610 East South Temple, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
_.-------· 
CJ:. .. ;, S·.::--
~ 
'! ,, 
I 
_::/ 
. ~,i 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT ONE 
REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED 
BOTH AS A MATTER OF STATUTORY 
RIGHT AND AS A MATTER OF POLICY 
Rehearing should be granted for three reasons: 
A. The Case was Incorrectly Decided. 
B. Petitioner Has a Statutory Right to Rehearing. 
In this case, two justices joined in the "majority" 
opinion. Two justices joined in the "dissent." Justice Stewart 
concurred in the result. § 78-2-3 U.C.A. states: 
The concurrence of three justices of the 
Supreme Court is necessary to pronounce 
a judgment; if three do not concur, the 
case must be reheard. l/ 
Here, three justices concurred in the result. However, 
that is not enough. It is also necessary for three justices to 
concur in the opinion. Article VIII § 25 of the Utah Consti-
tution states that: 
!/ There is some ambiguity in the language. The statute could 
be read in two different ways: 
. if three do not concur [in the result), the 
case must be reheard." 
or 
. . if three do not concur [in the opinion) , the 
case must be reheard." 
However, unless three justices concur in the result, 
there can be no decision. If there is no decision, there would 
be no reason for rehearing. Or, in other words, rehearing is 
only necessary after three justices have concurred in a result 
(decision) but failed to concur in an opinion. Thus, it would 
appear that the latter alternative is the only logical construction. 
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When a judgment or decree is reversed, 
modified or af firrned by the Supreme 
Court, the reasons therefore shall be 
stated in writing, signed by the justices 
concurring. 
In this case, only two justices signed the opinion. 
Thus, according to § 78-2-3 U.C.A., a rehearing must be granted. 
We do not contend that a case can never be decided 
without a majority opinion (i.e., three justices concurring). 
However, the thrust of § 78-2-3 U.C.A. clearly gives the losing 
party a rehearing if there is no majority opinion. 
C. Rehearing Should be Granted to Clear up the 
Confusion on this Important Issue of Law. 
As the case now stands, appellant has lost. However, 
an important issue of law has been left undecided. Here, only 
two justices signed the majority opinion. Thus, this case can 
never be cited as precedent. 
See for example: 
U.S. v. Friedman, 528 F.2d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 1976); 
People v. Jackson, 212 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Mich. 1973); 
State ex rel. Vesper-Buick Auto Co., v. Daues, 19 
S.W. 2d 700, 707 (Mo. 1929) "The opinion in the 
Barz case is not authoritative or controlling as 
a ruling or announcement of any rule or principle 
of law by this court, inasmuch as the opinion in 
that case did not have the concurrence of a 
majority of the judges of this court, only three 
of the judges having concurred in the opinion,~ 
equal number of judges having dissented to the 
opinion, and one of the judges concurring on~ 
in the result of the decision of the court." 
[Emphasis from the original.) 
Therefore, we have a decision, but an important issue 
of law is left undecided. This is an area which requires the 
guidance of this court. (See e.g., Exhibits A, B, and C to 
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Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants.) However, this decision 
will leave the lower courts in hopeless confusion. Indeed, the 
very unsettled nature of this decision may spawn a whole wave 
of new litigation. Thus, the court should, as a matter of 
policy, attempt to end the deadlock and decide the important 
issues of law presented by this case. 
POINT TWO 
THE SHORTCOMING OF THE MAJORITY 
OPINION CAN BE DEMONSTRATED BY A 
SINGLE EXAMPLE 
A. The Example. 
Suppose that the old-time citizens (oldtimers) of 
town are clamoring for a new playground. For the most part, 
the oldtimers live on the south side of town, and they want the 
new playground located in their south-side neighborhood. It 
is estimated that the cost of the new playground will be $10,000. 
However, the oldtimers do not want their taxes increased. 
At that same time, Mr. Subdivider walks in the door 
to get his new subdivision approved for the north side of town. 
The mayor (wishing to get re-elected) sees an opportunity to 
get the needed $10,000. The town approves the new subdivision 
on the condition that the subdivider will pay a $10,000 fee. 
The subdivider (having no real choice) pays the 
$10,000 to get his subdivision approved for the north side of 
town. The town collects the $10,000 and thereby finances a 
new playground for the oldtimers. Of course, north-side children 
are free to use the south-side playground. But, it is far away, 
and few of them do so. 
-3-
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In this example, the old-time residents found a device' 
by which new residents would finance improvements (in this case 
a playground) which was for the primary benefit of the oldtimers 
Although they paid the bill, the new residents got little or 
no value from the expenditure. 
illegal. 
All of the cases agree that the $10, 000 fee would be 
(See Footnote 6 of Green Sheet Opinion--see also 
Brief of Appellant p. 10-28.) Indeed, the majority opinion 
pays lip service to the doctrine: 
We agree that the dedication should 
have some reasonable relationship to the 
needs created by the subdivision. 
(Green Sheet Opinion at p. 4.) 
B. Application of the Example to the Facts of 
this Case. 
The majority opinion presumes that there is some 
difference between the example above and the facts of this case. 
The opinion presumes that West Jordan needs some new parks, 
playgrounds or flood control. The opinion presumes that the 
normal sources of revenue are insufficient to finance the 
improvements. The opinion presumes that the town has some plan 
in mind (or on paper) to provide the improvements. The opinion 
presumes that the improvements will benefit every part of town 
(not just the oldtimers). The opinion presumes that a fee of 
7% (times the total number of new subdivisions) will equal the 
cost of the improvements. 
The trouble is that the foregoing is all guesswork. 
There is absolutely no factual development to confirm how, wher 
-4-
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or where the money will be used. For all we really know, the 
entire $16,576 from appellants will be used to build a play-
ground for the oldtimers ten miles from the new subdivision. 
us: 
In anticipation of this problem, the majority tells 
. that it will be used for its 
stated purpose is assured, first, by 
the integrity and good faith of the 
public officials charged with that 
responsibility; and second, by the 
fact that the recognized principle 
is that if money is collected from the 
public for a specific purpose, it be-
comes a trust fund committed to the 
carrying out of that purpose. 
However, those truisms won't work. There is not one 
word in the ordinance which would prohibit West Jordan from 
using the $16,576 to build a new playgroun~ ten miles from the 
new subdivision. Or, stated in other words, West Jordan can 
in full good faith, and without breaching any trust, spend the 
$16,576 anywhere in town. The public must be protected by the 
words of the ordinance--not the good faith pf the officials! 
In this regard, it is instructive to compare the 
language of the West Jordan ordinance with the Walnut Creek~/ 
ordinance. 
City of West Jordan 
Section 9-C-8(a). In addition to all 
other requirements prescribed under this 
ordinance the subdivider shall be required 
to dedicate seven per cent (7.0%) of the 
land of the proposed subdivision to the 
~/ The majority opinion relies heavily upon the case of 
Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay Inc. v. Walnut 
Creek, 94 Cal. Rptr. 638, 454 P.2d 606 (1971) · 
-5-
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public use for the benefit of the 
citizens of West Jordan . or in 
the alternative at the option of the 
governing body of the City, the City 
may accept the equivalent value of the 
land in cash if it deems advisable. 
Section 9-C-8 (b),. The monies received 
by the City as a result of [this ordinance] 
. shall be used by the City for its 
flood control and/or parks and recreation 
facilities. 
Walnut Creek 
(c) The land, fees, or combination 
thereof are to be used only for the purpose 
of providing park or recreational facilities 
to serve the subdivision. 
(e) The amount and location of land 
to be dedicated or the fees to be paid shall 
bear a reasonable relationship to the use of 
the park and recreational facilities by the 
future inhabitants of the subdivision. 
Walnut Creek, supra at 609. 
It is obvious that the Walnut Creek ordinance prori~ 
clear direction and protection. The West Jordan ordinance is 
so broad and general as to be almost meaningless. It is no 
answer to contend that the money was illegally taken but wtll 
spent (Robin Hood). This case does not attack the manner of 
spending. This case attacks the ordinance under which the 
money was taken. 
POINT THREE 
THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THE 
MAJORITY OPINION IS SIMPLY TO 
SET UP A "SLUSH FUND" FOR CITY 
FATHERS 
We suggest that the issue in this case really has 
nothing to do with statutes, ordinances or prior case law. 
Rather, the struggle in this case has to do with some hard, 
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-practical realities. The majority is understandably concerned 
with the explosive growth of smaller Utah communities. The 
majority espouses the wholly laudable view that town fathers 
should have the power and the financing to provide "elbow room." 
This is a difficult case to prosecute because flood 
control, parks and recreation are a bit like motherhood--
everyone is in favor. Indeed, no one can gainsay the majority's 
view that: 
Just how essential and desirable 
it is that cities have such authority 
in planning their growth is brought into 
sharp focus by reflecting, on the one 
hand, upon the conditions in the slum 
and ghetto areas of various cities, 
where there are none, or inadequate, 
parks and playgrounds and, on the other, 
upon the enrichment of life which has 
been conferred on other cities where 
there are parks, plazas, recreational 
and cultural areas (some of which are 
very famous) for the use of the public. 
However, the question is whether the West Jordan 
ordinance (or for that matter the 7%) really contributes to 
that end. One might speculate that the ordinance simply gives 
West Jordan a tidy "slush fund" or "pork barrel." New residents 
pay into that "slush fund" (through subdivision fees). However, 
the city fathers are free to spend that money wherever and 
however they wish so long as the expenditure is generally 
related to "flood control and/or parks and recreation." 
We suggest that the growth of our cities can be 
managed in other ways. Further, we suggest that the place to 
begin is in the legislature--not the courts. 
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Finally, we observe that there are sound policy 
reasons against this practice. One of the great bulwarks of 
our society is the ability of an average family to purchase a 
home. (Note the concern in the majority opinion over ghettos .. 
"1 
There are many factors which stand between an averaa: 
family and their "dream home"--inflation, energy costs, hi~ 
interest rates, etc. By this opinion, we now add a new burden., 
A prospective homeowner in West Jordan (and perhaps other 
communities) must now pay $500-$1,000 more for that "dream horn' 
·, 
so that the town fathers can administer their "slush fund. 11 11, 
Of course, it is all in the good name of floodcontr·: 
parks and recreation. If the homeowner is lucky, that new 
playground will be in his neighborhood. If he is not lucky, 
it will be ten miles ·away in the oldtimers' neighborhood. 
Certainly there is nothing in the ordinance or in the majority 
opinion which would provide such protection. 
DATED this 'f..p._ day of January, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
. j 
ROB RT J. DEBRY 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
1/ Of course, the "slush fund" is in addition to all of the 
standard forms of taxation and revenue. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing 
Petition for Reconsideration and Memorandum in Support of 
Reconsideration was served upon Nick J. Colessides, attorney 
for respondent, by U. S. mail, postage prepaid, this .y+'--
day of January, 1980. 
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